I study the relationship between debt maturity and agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in unlisted firms. Exploiting cross-province variance in the development of local credit markets, I find that the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt is more effective in firms with less concentrated ownership structures.
Introduction
Several scholars investigated the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance (for a review see Demsetz and Villalonga 2001) . Most studies have used firm value as dependent variable and have focused on listed firms located in the US. Central to these works is the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) that explains the conflict between inside controlling shareholders -who are active in running the firm, and choosing the management/executive positions (Pagano and Röell 1998; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) -and outside minority shareholders.
A more recent literature has studied the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in unlisted entrepreneurial firms (Colombo et al. 2014) . Such literature has shown that bank monitoring is an effective governance mechanism to reduce potential agency costs between the two typical types of owners of unlisted entrepreneurial firms: owner-managers (controlling shareholders and corporate decision makers) and non-manager individual shareholders. First, the higher is the debt-to-asset ratio, the higher is the threat of bankruptcy, and the less opportunistic are the corporate decisions of owner-managers. Second, bank monitoring is an increasing function of a firm's default risk (Harvey et al. 2004 ) -which is positively related to the debt-to-asset ratio. Finally, bank monitoring is a powerful disciplining practice to unlisted firms because of less alternative external corporate governance mechanisms than those available to listed firms (Ang et al. 2000) . As shown by Colombo et al. (2014) , banks require unlisted firms to "use their assets more efficiently and discourage perquisite consumption, producing positive effects on firms' performance" (p. 268). This argument is in line with Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis (1986) that financial debt impacts on a firm's efficiency.
I claim that the monitoring function of bank debt is not effective per se but it depends on debt maturity. Shortening debt maturity would make it more likely that banks will restrict managerial discretion. The extant literature has studied the impact of managerial stock ownership on the maturity structure of corporate debt (Datta et al. 2005) , and how short-term debt in listed firms mitigates the agency costs between managers and shareholders. However, there is no evidence on the relationship between debt maturity and conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The second contribution of the paper is that bank monitoring might be influenced by a firm's ownership concentration. As shown by Claessens et al. (2002) , ownership concentration positively impacts firm performance when cash-flow rights are aligned with control rights -as is the case of unlisted entrepreneurial firms. Short-term debt increases exposure to credit and liquidity risks, and reduces the opportunism of owner-managers. However, such opportunism is lower when ownership is concentrated: the controlling shareholders' cash flow rights increase, and hence their motivation for expropriation decreases. Thus, the higher is the ownership concentration, the lower is the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt.
Data
I consider a sample of independent 1 Italian owner-managed unlisted firms that are less than 25 years old, and are observed in the period 1994-2008. The sample was extracted from the RITA (Research on Entrepreneurship in Advanced Technologies) database, which is the most complete and detailed source of information available for this type of firms in Italy. 2 Data have been gathered from secondary sources and a series of national surveys administered in the time period 2000-2009 (for details, see Colombo et al. 2014) . I built the complete history of the ownership structure for a sample of 134 firms. χ 2 tests show that there are no statistically significant differences between the distribution of the 134 sampled firms across geographic areas and the corresponding distribution of the RITA population from which the sample was drawn (χ 2 (19)= 23.538). In Table 1 , I show summary statistics of firm efficiency, measured as the asset utilization ratio. This latter is the annual sales value divided by total assets in logarithms -a standard metric in the financial economics literature (Ang et al. 2000) . I distinguish between: i) firms with a higher and those with a lower ownership concentration than the median value (0.3642), and ii) firms with a higher and those with a lower short-term debt-to-asset ratio than the median value (0.64). 3 Ownership concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman measure of share concentration: ∑ , where Si is the percentage of equity held by the owner i, and n is the total number of owners. Two-sample mean comparison t tests
show that the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt is more effective in firms with less concentrated ownership structures. Nonparametric K-sample median comparison tests do not confirm this univariate result, and this may be explained by the distributions of the ownership concentration and short-term bank debt (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 ).
Econometric specification
I specify the following equation: * .
( 1 )
Efficiencyit is the asset utilization ratio, OwnConcit is the ownership concentration, 4 and ShortDTAit is the short-term debt-to-asset ratio. Xit includes the operating cash-flow-to-asset ratio (CFTAit), and logarithms of a firm's total assets (Sizeit) and age (Ageit). t is a set of time dummies, i includes industry and region dummies, and it is the error term. All accounting variables are winsorized at 1%.
If ownership structure, short-term debt-to-asset ratio, and firm efficiency are jointly determined, OLS and random effects (RE) results would be biased. Thus, I resorted to a fixed effects (FE) estimation to control for time-unvarying endogeneity. Moreover, I used a static GMM-system estimator with an additional exogenous instrument to improve estimate consistency (Benfratello and Sembenelli 2006) .
Such instrument exploits the variance across provinces (NUTS 3 level) of the development of local
credit markets (number of bank branches per 100,000 inhabitants; source: Bank of Italy). As highlighted by Benfratello et al. (2008) , branch density is also an inverse measure of distance between firms and banks, and thus a direct measure of a firm's access to debt finance (as to Italy, see
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi 2001). Moreover, the easier is the access to debt finance, the lower is 
Results and conclusions
The econometric results are shown in Table 2 . OLS and RE estimates are shown for comparison purposes only. As to the control variables, I find that smaller and older firms are more efficient (for a similar evidence on the same dataset, see Colombo et al. 2011). 5 Moreover, a higher cash-flow-toasset ratio leads to a higher firm efficiency. As to ownership concentration, I find a positive effect on firm efficiency in FE estimation; while, this effect is negligible when controlling for time-varying endogeneity (in line with Demsetz and Villalonga 2001) . Legend. Estimates are derived from OLS (column I), RE and FE regressions with firm-clustered standard errors (columns II and III, respectively), and GMM-SYS with finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix (column IV).
Moment conditions of endogenous variables start from t-3 for instruments in levels and t-2 for instruments in differences.
NACE industry codes are: 29.5, 30.02, 32, 33, 35.5, 64.2, 72.2, 72.60, 73. 1. Robust standard errors in round brackets.
Degrees of freedom are in square brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In both FE and GMM regressions, I find a positive and statistically significant effect (at 1%) of shortterm bank debt on firm efficiency. The associated elasticity ranges between +13.3% and +27.3% in GMM and FE estimates respectively, both significant at 1%. When interacted with OwnConcit, such elasticity decreases to +6.3% (significant at 10%) and +12% (significant at 5%) in GMM and FE estimations, respectively.
As was expected, the monitoring function of banks in the short-term is influenced by ownership concentration. In unlisted firms -where cash-flow rights are aligned with control rights -a higher ownership concentration reduces the efficiency-function of short-term bank debt.
In Table 3 , I substituted short-term debt with long-term debt (and its interaction with ownership concentration). Both coefficients (LongDTAit and OwnConcit*LongDTAit) are negligible, confirming that the monitoring function of bank debt depends on its maturity. As robustness checks, I removed the most densely populated region in Italy (Lombardy) from the sample, and I substituted the country and year dummies with their cross-products. Results are almost unchanged.
This study has some limitations which are opportunities for future research. First, an enlargement of sample size would be useful to check the robustness of my results. Second, other variables may lower the monitoring of banks in the short-term, such as the ownership type or the quality of institutions.
As to the latter, future studies should test whether my results hold in institutional settings with different accounting disclosure, debt enforcement, creditor rights, and national cultures.
